The Hidden Costs of Extra Security - NYTimes.com

Something I suspected was true, but didn't have the facts to back up. Enhanced security measures make people not fly. Sometimes, instead of flying, they drive. Driving is inherently more dangerous than flying. A Cornell study estimates 500+ people are dying a year because of more intrusive and inconvenient security procedures. Yeah, we may prevent one additional plane brought down every decade or so saving maybe 100 lives, but still.... the transportation safety administration is making transportation LESS SAFE. Dead is Dead, I don't care whether it's by a terrorist attack or a car crash. Story here: The Hidden Costs of Extra Security - NYTimes.com

Biomass processing advance

An article about a nice little advance in the processing of biomass as a chemical feedstock: A Greener Way to Make Plastic - ScienceNOW. One thing I'd love to see more research on is hydrogassification of biomass (performing the pyrolysis step under a reducing hydrogen atmosphere). If done with hydrogen produced by electrolysis of water by electricity from some non-carbon producing source, it can upgrade the fuel value of the biomass, while still producing easily handled hydrocarbon fuels. The energy content of the US's agricultural waste comes close to our consumption of gasoline. There's real possibilities there for a much lower carbon footprint.

My TSA Anti-Rant | Mother Jones

A friend posted a link to this article: My TSA Anti-Rant | Mother Jones and well, I felt compelled to comment. Excerpts of the article to follow, with my comments.

I've heard it called "security theater" so many times I'd be rich if I had a nickel for each time it popped up in my browser, but although the anti-TSA rants are often cathartic and amusing, they've never made much sense to me. All the crap that TSA goes through actually seems pretty clearly directed at improving the security of air travel.

Well, if course it seems directed at improving the security of air travel. The argument for "security theater" is that the TSA is doing things that appear to be helping, but don't, or aren't as effective as they are intrusive, or expensive. And that to some extent, are chosen because they allow the TSA to be seen to be doing something. Usually in response to an attempted attack that... failed. Because someone tried and failed to bring down a plane with a shoe-bomb, we take off our shoes, because someone tried with an underwear bomb, we get full-body scanners (scanners which were not designed to detect explosives, and may not actually be effective at doing so. Because some terrorists were caught plotting to use liquid explosives (or homemade explosives with a liquid ingredient), we can't have liquids on planes. The security measures are reactive securing Americans against the last threat. Because terrorists were The author goes on to argue:

Ditto for terrorists, who learn from their mistakes. Maybe next time they'll try a slightly bigger shoe. Or a better explosive. Or a more efficient trigger. And then the plane comes down. Do you really want to risk your life on the proposition that terrorists will never figure out how to make this stuff work even if we give them enough chances?

Well, given that they followed up an attack using box cutters with a shoe bomb, which they followed up with an underwear bomb... I'm fairly convinced not only do they try and improve their existing attack methods, they try and come up with new ones we aren't taking specific precautions against. The liquid bombers used Tang and Hydrogen peroxide as their main charge. Tang and a chlorate or nitrate salt (powders) would work just as well as the Hydrogen Peroxide. An all-powder bomb. Are we protected against it? Not specifically.

The author also argues that we can't scale up Israel's security procedures to work in America. To some extent that may be true, getting that many trained screeners might be tough, but much of it we can. The reason their security works so well, is because rather than focusing on elements of certain possible attacks, they focus on the one thing all terrorist attacks have in common: terrorists. Hence the reliance on behavioral (not religious or ethinic) profiling (e.g. "is this person acting hinky"), and while we might not be able to afford to rely on it to the extent the Israelis do, we should do a lot more. But they also have a defense in depth, with multiple layers of screening (honestly, at this point a security screening checkpoint on a holiday weekend's probably a better target than a plane), and some just plain good ideas (bomb-proof boxes in the screening area). Mostly, I want to see broader, more proactive, multi-layered security. But reactivity allows the TSA to be seen to be doing something after each new threat, and it is that needing to do something after each attempt to try and make people feel safe, regardless of it's actual effectiveness, that makes it security theater. I'm glad it worked on the author, but me, I'd really rather see more signs of well, security.